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IGNORING STATE HOMESTEAD LAWS: SATISFYING
FEDERAL TAX LIENS THROUGH THE SALES OF
HOMESTEAD PROPERTY
United States v. Rodgers
103 S. Ct. 2132 (1983)
EDWARD N. DAVID*
Section 7403 of the Internal Revenue Code' authorizes a judicial
sale, in order to enforce a lien of the United States, 2 of any property in
which a delinquent taxpayer has any right, title or interest. 3 In a
number of states family homes4 or places of business5 have been desig-
* B.B.A., Accounting, University of Wisconsin, 1979; candidate for J.D., 1985
lIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. The author expresses his thanks and appreciation to Profes-
sors Marvin Green and Jeffrey G. Sherman for their assistance in commenting on drafts of this
article.
1. I.R.C. § 7403 (1984).
2. The lien of the United States would arise pursuant to the provisions of I.R.C. §§ 6321-
6326 (1984). At any time that a taxpayer becomes liable to pay any tax and neglects or refuses to
pay the same after a demand for payment has been made, the amount of total liability, including
interest, penalty and costs that may accrue, shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all
property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to the delinquent taxpayer.
I.R.C. § 6321 (1984).
3. In any case where there has been a refusal or neglect to pay any tax, or to discharge
any liability in respect thereof, whether or not levy has been made, the Attorney General
or his delegate, at the request of the Secretary, may direct a civil action to be filed in a
district court of the United States to enforce the lien of the United States under this title
with respect to such tax or liability or to subject any property, of whatever nature, of the
delinquent, or in which he has any right, title, or interest, to the payment of such tax or
liability.
I.R.C. § 7403(a) (1984).
4. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. X, § 206; ARK. CONST. art. IX, § 3; CAL. CONST. art. XVII,
§ 1; FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a)(l); GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, 26; MICH. CoNsT. art. X, § 3; MINN.
CONST. art. I, § 12; NEV. CONST. art. IV, § 30; N.C. CONST. art. X, § 2; OKLA. CONST. art. XII, § 2;
S.D. CONST. art. XI, § 6; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 11; TEX. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 50-52; W.VA.
CONST. art. VI, § 48. ALASKA STAT. § 9.38.010 (1983); AIuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-101 (1974 &
Supp. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-41-201 (1973 & Supp. 1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 651-92
(Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE § 55-1004 (Supp. 1983); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 12-901 (1983); IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-2-28-1(a) (West 1983); IowA CODE ANN. § 561.16 (West 1946 & Supp. 1983);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2301 (1969); Ky. REV. STAT. § 427.060 (Supp. 1982); LA. REV. STAT. tit.
20, § I (West Supp. 1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 188, § I (West Supp. 1983); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 4422 (Supp. 1983-84); Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-3-21 (Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 513.475(1) (Vernon Supp. 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-32-101 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 40-101 (1978); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 480:4 (1955); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42-10-9 (1978 & Supp.
1983); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 5206(a) (McKinney Supp. 1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2329.66(A)(1) (Page 1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-41-200 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-23-3 (Supp. 1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 101 (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 34-4 (Supp.
1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 6.12.090 (1963 & Supp. 1983); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 815.20 (1977).
5. See, TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50.
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nated as homesteads, 6 and as such, are exempt from the reach of most
creditors. 7 Despite the protections afforded the homestead at the state
level, these same protections do not exist at the federal level especially
when the Internal Revenue Service reaches the taxpayer's homestead
property to satisfy its lien against the taxpayer.
State homestead laws have designated two types of property inter-
ests, a homestead exemption and a homestead interest, as being exempt
from the reach of most creditors. Homestead exemptions are limited
either with regard to area8 or with regard to value9 which is placed on
the homestead property. The exemption classification grants the claim-
ant a life interest in the property,'0 but the life interest is limited to the
value or area of exemption." Homestead interests are separate and
undivided possessory interests in the homestead which are akin to re-
mainder interests and which vest in each spouse the equivalent of an
undivided life estate in the homestead property. 12 The homestead in-
terest, as an undivided life estate in both a husband and wife, cannot be
divested during their lives, except by abandonment or by voluntary
conveyance.'
3
No matter how homestead laws are classified, they are intended to
6. "Homestead" has been defined as "an artificial estate in land, devised to protect the pos-
session and enjoyment of the owner against the claims of his creditors, by withdrawing the prop-
erty from execution and forced sale, so long as the land is occupied as a home." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 660 (5th ed. 1979).
7. In most instances, the homestead exemption will prevent a forced sale of the homestead
property, but in certain situations the homestead exemption will not prevent a forced sale. See,
e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 12-903 (1983) which authorizes a forced sale to satisfy a debt for
the non-payment of ad valorem property taxes or to satisfy a debt incurred for the purchase or
improvement of homestead property.
8. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. X, § 205 (80 acres); FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a)(l) (160 acres).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2301 (1983) limits the extent of the exemption to one hundred sixty acres of
farming land, or one acre within the limits of an incorporated town or city, occupied as a residence
by the family of the owner.
9. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. X, § 205 ($2,000.00); GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, 26 ($1,600.00);
MICH. CONST. art. X, § 3 ($3,500.00). ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1101 (1974 & Supp. 1983)
($50,000.00); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-41-201 (1973 & Supp. 1982) ($25,000.00); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 427.060 (Supp. 1982) ($5,000.00); LA. REV. STAT. tit. 20, § I (West Supp. 1984) ($15,000.00); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 4422 (West Supp. 1983) ($7,500.00); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 513.475(l)
(Vernon Supp. 1983) ($8,000.00); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42-10-9 (1978 & Supp. 1983) ($20,000.00).
10. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 12-901 (Supp. 1982) entitles every individual to an estate of
homestead to the extent of $7,500.00 in value. Although the statute limits the homestead in terms
of $7,500.00 in value, the courts have interpreted the homestead statute to create an estate in land
and not a mere exemption. Wiegand v. Wiegand, 410 I11. 533, 542, 103 N.E.2d 137, 142 (1952);
Garwood v. Garwood, 244 I11. 580, 585, 91 N.E. 672, 674 (1910).
11. Haskins, Homestead Exemptions, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1289, 1291 (1950).
12. See, United States v. Rodgers, 103 S.Ct. 2132, 2138-39 (1983).
13. United States v. Rodgers, 649 F.2d 1117, 1127 (5th Cir. 1981) (Construing Texas home-
stead law). Cf. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 12-902 (Supp. 1983) (Homestead continues after the
death of the householder for the benefit of the husband or wife surviving and who continues to
occupy the homestead).
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promote the security of the family by protecting the family from desti-
tution and pauperism. 14 The protection from destitution and pauperism
is accomplished by exempting the homestead from attachment, judg-
ment levy and judgment sale for the payment of debts. '5 Although this
protection would protect the homestead from attachment by one's cred-
itors,' 6 it no longer will provide protection against the Internal Reve-
nue Service seeking to enforce its lien against the taxpayer's homestead
property.
Prior to 1983, there was a split among the circuits with regard to
the effect of state homestead rights on federal tax liens. Some circuits
held that, under the supremacy clause,17 the enforcement of federal tax
liens was not barred by state property rights.' 8 Still others held that
state homestead statutes would immunize the homestead from the
reach of the federal tax lien under I.R.C. Section 7403.19 Even the
United States Supreme Court ruled that state law controls in determin-
ing the nature of the legal interest held by the taxpayer 20 and federal
law governs the priority of competing liens asserted against the tax-
payer's property or rights to the property.2' In United States v. Rod-
gers,22 the United States Supreme Court decided that under I.R.C.
Section 7403, a federal district court has the discretionary power to or-
der the sale of the entire homestead property in which a delinquent
taxpayer has any right, title, or interest.23 In its interpretation of the
14. Haskins, 63 HARV. L. REV. at 1289. See also United States v. Hershberger, 475 F.2d 677,
681 (10th Cir. 1973), quoting, Morris v. Ward, 5 Kan. 239, 244 (1869).
15. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 12-901 (Supp. 1983).
16. The homestead is not protected against attachment in all situations. For example, a cred-
itor could force the sale of a homestead to satisfy a debt that arose from the purchase or improve-
ment of homestead property.
17. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof. . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
18. United States v. Kocher, 468 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied 411 U.S. 931 (1973);
United States v. Overman, 424 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Trilling, 328 F.2d 699
(7th Cir. 1964).
19. Ingram v. City of Dallas Dept. of Housing and Urban Rehabilitation, 649 F.2d 1128 (5th
Cir. 1981); United States v. Rodgers, 649 F.2d 1117 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Hershberger,
475 F.2d 677 (10th Cir. 1973).
20. Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 513 (1960).
21. Id. at 513-14, citing, United States v. Vorrieter, 355 U.S. 15 (1957); United States v. White
Bear Brewing Co., 350 U.S. 1010, reh'g denied, 351 U.S. 958 (1956); United States v. Colotta, 350
U.S. 808 (1955); United States v. Scovil, 348 U.S. 218 (1955); United States v. Liverpool & London
& Globe Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 215 (1955); United States v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211 (1955); United States v.
City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954); United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U.S. 361
(1953); United States v. Security Trust & Sav. Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950); Illinois ex re. Gordon v.
Campbell, 329 U.S. 362 (1946); United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353
(1954). See also, I.R.C. § 6323 (1984).
22. 103 S.Ct. 2132 (1983).
23. Id at 2146.
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federal tax lien statutes24 and the available means of enforcement, 25 the
Court held that the non-delinquent taxpayer's homestead rights no
longer acted as a bar to a judicial sale of a home as authorized under
I.R.C. Section 7403.26
This comment first examines the history of federal tax liens, when
they arise, the type of property that can be attached, the priority over
other liens and the means of enforcement available. Next, the com-
ment examines the interpretations of the federal tax lien statutes by
federal courts in regard to the enforcement of liens against property
designated as a homestead. The Rodgers opinion will be presented and
analyzed. Finally the impact of the Rodgers opinion on homestead
property will be discussed. It will conclude that the recognition of state
homestead rights as a bar against foreclosure of a federal tax lien
would not yield a different result and would provide greater protections
for the non-delinquent taxpayer than would nonrecognition of state
homestead rights.
ATTACHMENT AND ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL TAX LIENS
Federal tax liens arise under Section 6321 of the Internal Revenue
Code when "any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay
the same after demand, the amount . . . shall be a lien in favor of the
United States upon all property and rights to property . . . belonging
to such person. ' 27 Though I.R.C. Section 6321 refers to the nonpay-
ment of any tax as giving rise to a lien in favor of the United States, the
lien does not arise until the tax has been assessed, 28 a deficiency has
been determined,29 notice and demand for payment have been made
30
and the taxpayer refuses or neglects to pay the tax due.
3'
24. I.R.C. §§ 6321-6326 (1984).
25. I.R.C. §§ 6331-6343 (1984).
26. Rodgers, 103 S.Ct. at 2146.
27. I.R.C. § 6321 (1984).
28. I.R.C. § 6201(a) (1984) authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to assess all taxes deter-
mined by the taxpayer or by the Secretary as to which returns are made under the Code. The
assessment of tax is an administrative determination of the amount due either based upon tax-
payer returns or upon a determination of liability by the Internal Revenue Service. 4 BITrKER,
FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS, 111.5.5 (1981 & Supp. 1983).
29. In the event that the tax imposed by the Code exceeds the excess of the sum of the
amount shown as the tax due by the taxpayer upon his return plus amounts previously assessed as
deficiency over the sum of abatements, credits, refunds and payments, a deficiency arises under
I.R.C. § 6211 (1984).
30. I.R.C. § 6303(a) (1984) provides that within 60 days of making an assessment of a tax, the
taxpayer liable for the unpaid tax must be given notice which indicates the amount due and de-
mands payment of that amount.
31. If payment of the deficient amount is not made within the allowable 10 day period then
the lien provisions of Section 6321 take effect retroactively to the date of assessment.
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The original lien provisions were proposed within the context of
an act in 186432 that provided for "internal revenue to support the gov-
ernment to pay interest on the public debt, and for other purposes."
33
The first lien provisions were enacted in 1865. 34 Within the context of
the Internal Revenue Act 35 the lien provisions were very similar to
those found in the current lien provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code.36 Specifically, the original tax lien act provided that upon find-
ing of tax liability and the neglect or refusal to pay the amount after
demand was made, that the amount due became a lien in favor of the
United States from the date that the liability first arose until payment
was made.37 After demand for payment by the collector and refusal to
pay by the taxpayer, the collector, by levy or by warrant, was author-
ized to levy upon all property and rights to property belonging to the
delinquent taxpayer.38 In 1866, the original tax lien act was incorpo-
rated and amended as part of the Internal Revenue Act of 1866. 39
Once a lien in favor of the United States arises, the provisions of
I.R.C. Section 633140 provide for the collection of such delinquent
taxes by levy upon all property and rights to property belonging to the
delinquent taxpayer or on which there is a lien provided in I.R.C. Sec-
tion 6321 for the payment of such tax.4 1 The provisions authorizing the
execution of the lien on the delinquent taxpayer's property originate
from the Internal Revenue Act of 1865,42 as do the original lien provi-
sions of the Internal Revenue Code.
43
Despite the fact that the statute authorizes a levy upon all property
and rights to property which belong to the delinquent taxpayer, I.R.C.
Section 633444 exempts nine specific types of property from levy. 45 His-
32. 13 Stat. ch. 173 (1864).
33. Id.
34. 13 Stat. ch. 78 (1865).
35. Id.
36. I.R.C. §§ 6321-6326 (1984).
37. 13 Stat. ch. 78 (1865). The original act did not limit applicability of the tax lien provi-
sions to individuals. Banks, associations, companies and corporations that became liable for taxes
or duties, were also subject to the lien provisions. See infra notes 65-77 and accompanying text
with regard to the priority of a federal tax lien over other types of iens.
38. Id.
39. 14 Stat. ch. 184 (1866).
40. I.R.C. § 6331 (1984).
41. I.R.C. § 6331(a) (1984).
42. 13 Stat. ch. 78 (1865).
43. Id.
44. I.R.C. § 6334 (1984).
45. The following types of property are specifically exempt from levy to enforce a lien:
1. Wearing apparel and school books as are necessary for the taxpayer or for his family; 2. Fuel,
provisions, furniture and personal effects in the taxpayer's household and arms for personal use,
livestock and poultry which does not exceed $1,500 in value; 3. Books and tools necessary for the
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torically, property exempt from levy was limited to personal effects and
tools or implements of a trade or profession.46 A subsequent amend-
ment to the Internal Revenue Act of 1865 enlarged the scope of exempt
property and clarified the value and quantity of personal effects that
were exempt from levy.4 7 Subsequent amendments have expanded the
types of exempt property to its current status.
48
Except for property specifically enumerated as being exempt,
I.R.C. Section 6334(c) 49 provides that no other property shall be ex-
empt from levy. Although the Code limits property exemptions to spe-
cific types of property, historically this was not true. The original tax
lien provisions enacted in 186550 provided for the exemption of real
property while personal property was subject to lien.5' In the event of
distraint for payment of duties or taxes, the goods, chattels, or effects so
distrained could be restored to the owner or possessor upon payment of
the delinquent taxes or duties prior to sale.5 2 A literal reading of the
statute indicates that the only property subject to a tax lien was tangible
personal property and not real property. Amendments further exempt-
ing other types of property have expanded the scope of the lien provi-
trade, business or profession of taxpayer which do not exceed $1,000 in aggregate value; 4. Unem-
ployment benefits paid under federal or state unemployment compensation laws; 5. Undelivered
mail; 6. Annuity and pension payments received under the Railroad Retirement Act, the Railroad
Unemployment Insurance Act, due to taxpayer's status as a recipient of a military medal of honor
or based on retired or retainer pay under 10 U.S.C. § 73; 7. Workmen's compensation paid under
federal or state workmen's compensation laws; 8. Judgments which taxpayer is required to pay
from his salary or other income in support of minor children and which were entered prior to the
date of levy; 9. A minimum amount of wages and other income which is computed as minimum of
$75 plus and additional $25 for each dependency exemption. I.R.C. §§ 6334(a)(l)-(a)(9) (1984).
See also, Treas. Reg. § 301.6334-1 (1979); 9 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
§ 54.52.
46. 13 Stat. ch. 78 (1865). The personal effects included one cow, arms, provisions, house-
hold furniture, school books and apparel necessary for a family.
47. 14 Stat. ch. 184 (1866). Added to the list of exempt property were two hogs; five sheep
and the wool thereof, provided that the aggregate market value of the sheep did not exceed $50;
the necessary food for the cow, hogs and sheep for a period of 30 days; $25 of fuel; $50 of provi-
sions; $300 of household furniture; and $100 of books, tools, and implements of a trade or
profession.
48. See, Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act, Pub. L.No. 97-248, § 347(a), 96 Stat. 638
(1982); Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L.No. 94-455, §§ 1209(a)-(c), 1906(b)(13)(A), 90 Stat. 1709-
10, 1834 (1976); Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L.No. 91-172, § 945(a), 83 Stat. 729 (1969); Federal
Tax Lien Act of 1966, Pub. L.No. 89-719, § 104(c), 80 Stat. 1137 (1966); Excise Tax Reduction Act
of 1965, Pub. L.No. 89-44, § 812(a), 79 Stat. 170 (1965); Social Security Act Amendments of 1958,
Pub. L.No. 85-840, § 406, 72 Stat. 1047 (1958).
49. I.R.C. § 6334(c) (1984).
50. 13 Stat. ch. 78 (1865).
5 I. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text. Although the Act provided for a lien upon
all property, the language incorporated distinguished between real and personal property.
52. 13 Stat. ch. 78 (1865). Accord, 14 Stat. ch. 184 (1866). But see, I.R.C. § 6334(c) (1984)
which limits the exemption from distraint to the property or rights to property enumerated in
I.R.C. §§ 6334(a)(l)-(a)(9) (1984).
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sions from liens that attached to only tangible personal property to
liens that attached to all real and personal property, unless otherwise
exempted. The reach of the lien provisions beyond personal property
to real property eventually formed a basis for the Court's decision in
Rodgers.
I.R.C. Section 7403,53 in conjunction with I.R.C. Sections 6321
and 6331, provides that a civil action may be filed to enforce the tax
liens that arose due to the refusal or neglect to pay any tax after a
demand was made.54 In the event that enforcement of the tax lien is
sought, any property owned outright by the delinquent taxpayer, or
any property in which he has any right, title, or interest 55 may be sold.
The proceeds of such sale will be distributed according to the findings
of the court in respect of the relative interests in the property.56 The
original version of I.R.C. Section 7403 provided that in all instances
where the court found that a valid tax lien existed, sale of the real estate
to satisfy the lien was mandatory. 57  Unlike the current version of
I.R.C. Section 7403 that allows for the sale of all property, the original
version limited the sale to real property. 58 Presently, the district courts
have the discretionary authority to order the sale of real estate in which
the delinquent taxpayer has any interest, right or title. The modifica-
tion of the district court's authority occurred in 1936 when the phrase
"shall decree a sale" was amended to read "may decree a sale."'59
In 1966, Congress enacted legislation that directly affected the dis-
tribution of proceeds based on the interests held by all involved parties.
As part of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966,60 a lien of the Internal
Revenue Service created an interest in the property to the extent of the
value of the lien,6I but it did not create a property right in the tax-
payer's property.62 Furthermore, the federal tax lien did not have pri-
53. I.R.C. § 7403 (1984).
54. I.R.C. § 7403(a) (1984).
55. Id.
56. I.R.C. §§ 7403(b) & (c) provide that all persons, other than the taxpayer, having or claim-
ing any interest in the real property subject to lien must be made a party to the action. Once all
the interests are identified, the court then proceeds to determine the merits of all claims and liens
upon the property. If in the exercise of its discretionary authority, the court decrees a sale, then
the proceeds are distributed according to the court's determination of the interests of the parties
and of the United States.
57. 15 Stat. ch. 186 (1868).
58. But see supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
59. Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, 49 Stat. 1648 (1936).
60. Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, Pub. L.No. 89-719, 80 Stat. 1125 (1966).
61. United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 103 S.Ct. 2309, 2316 (1983).
62. United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 55 (1958).
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ority over other secured interests in the property.63 State law governed
the attachment of liens even though federal law governed the type of
property that could be attached.64
Upon the attachment of the taxpayer's property as provided in
I.R.C. Section 632 1,65 the execution of the lien under I.R.C. Section
633166 and the judicial sale of the taxpayer's property 67 are governed
by the priority provisions of I.R.C. Section 6323.68 I.R.C. Section 6323
recognizes that the effect of federal tax liens is not governed solely by
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, but that provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 69 the Bankruptcy Act 70 and state law regu-
lating the rights of secured creditors must also be considered. 71  The
Internal Revenue Code segregates the types of creditors that are pro-
tected 72 against the unfiled lien73 from those creditors to which the
"first in time, first in right" principle of the Uniform Commercial Code
applies. 74 Even if notice is filed, 75 ten classes 76 of creditors still retain
63. I.R.C. § 6323 (1984). See also, 4 BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES
AND GIFTS, 111.5.4.(1981 & Supp. 1983).
64. I.R.C. § 6321 provides that there "shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all
property and rights to property, whether real or personal," belonging to the delinquent taxpayer.
65. I.R.C. § 6321 (1984).
66. I.R.C. § 6331 (1984).
67. I.R.C. § 7403 (1984).
68. I.R.C. § 6323 (1984).
69. See, U.C.C. §§ 9-301-18 (1978).
70. See, II U.S.C. § 507(a)(6) (1982).
71. 4 BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS, 111.5.4 (1981 &
Supp. 1983).
72. Id. Four classes of creditors would have automatic priority over a federal tax lien. The
class includes good faith purchasers for value; holders of security interests; mechanic's lienors; and
judgment lien creditors. See also, I.R.C. §§ 6323(a) and (h) (1984).
73. I.R.C. § 6323(a) (1984). Not until filing would creditors have any notice of the existence
of a tax lien. In order to protect this class of creditors against the "secret" federal tax lien the
Code provides that the tax lien will be invalid until notice is given. A federal tax lien is essentially
a "secret" lien because it takes effect retroactively as of the date of assessment and arises automati-
cally upon the taxpayer's neglect or refusal to pay any tax due. See, Plumb, Federal Liens and
Priorities-Agendafor the Next Decade, 77 YALE L.J., 228, 229 (1967).
74. U.C.C. §§ 9-312(5)(a), (b), and (6) (1978).
75. See, I.R.C. § 6323(f) (1984) with regard to the filing requirements.
76. I.R.C. § 6323(b) (1984) provides that the following classes of creditors have super-priority
over a federal tax lien: I. Purchasers of corporate or other securities; 2. Purchasers of motor
vehicles; 3. Purchasers of tangible personal property sold in a retailer's ordinary course of busi-
ness; 4. Purchasers of up to $250 of tangible personal property, household goods and other per-
sonal effects in a casual sale; (Also, the purchasers listed in 1-4 only have priority over a federal
tax lien if they did not have actual notice or knowledge of the existence of such lien at the time
they acquired the property.) 5. Tangible personal property subject to a possessory lien to secure
the reasonable price of repair or improvement to such property; 6. Real property tax and special
assessment liens which are prior in time and which secure payment of ad valorem or special
assessment taxes or for public utilities or services; 7. Mechanic's liens on residential property not
exceeding four dwelling units or $1,000 in value; 8. Attorney's lien on judgments and settlements
subject to tax liens; 9. Claims of an insurer on life, endowment or annuity insurance contracts with
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their super-priority 77 over the federal tax lien. Although creditors of
the delinquent taxpayer are offered some protection against a federal
tax lien, unless the court recognizes that a state homestead interest cre-
ates a vested property right, a non-delinquent taxpayer with an interest
in the property would not have the same protection that a creditor has
against the enforcement of a federal tax lien.
Prior to the Court's decision in Rodgers, there was a split among
the circuits with regard to the protections that state homestead rights
afforded a non-delinquent taxpayer against a federal tax lien. In
Herndon v. United States,78 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit held that the taxpayer spouse's homestead interest did
not prevent the government's foreclosure of its lien on the homestead
property.79 The court held that under the exemption limitation of
Treas. Reg. § 301.6334-1(c) (1979)80 and the supremacy clause, federal
collection of taxes should be prior to any rights of a state to exempt its
citizens from federal taxing power.81 Since homestead interests or
rights were not specifically exempt under I.R.C. Section 6334(c), and
since Congress had not acted to create a homestead exemption, the
court was not willing, on its own, to create a homestead exemption. 82
In United States v. Hershberger,83 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit bifurcated the homestead interest into prop-
erty exemptions and property rights that existed under state law.84 The
court stated that a homestead exemption, created under state law to
protect the non-taxpayer spouse's interest from general creditors,
would not prevent an execution of a federal tax lien against that
spouse's interest.8 5 Where the state law created a present property in-
terest in the homestead property, then the homestead interest was a
respect to automatic advances required to keep the policy in force; 10. Passbook loans by savings
institutions.
77. A federal tax lien would be invalid as against either the four classes of creditors protected
against an unfiled federal tax lien and as against the ten classes of creditors protected against a
filed federal tax lien. See supra notes 63 and 67.
78. 501 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1974).
79. Id. at 1222-23.
80. "No provision of a State law may exempt property or rights to property from levy for the
collection of any Federal tax. Thus, property exempt from execution under State personal or
homestead exemption laws is, nevertheless, subject to levy by the United States for collection of its
taxes."
81. Herndon, 501 F.2d at 1223.
82. Id.
83. 475 F.2d 677 (10th Cir. 1973).
84. This rationale was consistent with the decision in Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509
(1960) that state law would govern the nature of the interest created.
85. Hershberger, 475 F.2d at 682.
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valid protection against the execution of a federal tax lien. 86 Under
Kansas law,87 a homestead consisted of one acre of land located within
the city limits if occupied as a family residence. As the Kansas state
courts had interpreted the homestead provisions, a present property in-
terest existed in the homestead property which granted the taxpayer's
spouse an immediate enjoyment in the homestead property. 88 As the
Hershberger court interpreted Kansas law, the indivisible and vested
interest in homestead property protected the property against levy and
sale to satisfy the delinquent spouse's federal tax liability. 89
In Rodgers, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit, following the Hershberger court's reasoning, held that because
Texas law created a present property interest 90 that the federal tax lien
could not be enforced against the homestead property occupied by Mrs.
Rodgers.91
STATE HOMESTEAD RIGHTS AND EXEMPTIONS
The state homestead exemption traces its origin to an 1839 statute
of the Republic of Texas that granted an exemption of fifty acres or one
town lot, including a homestead and improvements, not exceeding five
hundred dollars in value. 92 Following Texas's lead, almost all 93 the
remaining states adopted a homestead exemption by constitutional
amendment 94 or by statute.95 Although the state constitutions and stat-
utes consider the homestead as creating an exemption, some states have
interpreted their homestead laws to create a present property interest in
a spouse.
96
The creation of a homestead is conditioned upon the occurrence of
certain events in order to protect it from attachment and execution by
general creditors. In order for the property to qualify as a homestead,
the property must belong to the head of the family 97 and the family
86. Id.
87. KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 9. See also, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2301 (1964).
88. Hershberger, 475 F.2d at 680, citing, Helm v. Helm, I I Kan. 19 (1873).
89. Id. at 682, quoting, Jones v. Kemp, 144 F.2d 478 (10th Cir. 1944).
90. Rodgers, 649 F.2d at 1120, 1127.
91. Id. at 1127-28.
92. Act of Jan. 26, 1839, art. 684, 1839 Laws of the Republic of Texas, 3d Cong., 1st Sess. 113.
93. See supra note 4.
94. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XVII, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a)(1); TEX. CONST. art.
XVI, §§ 50-52.
95. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 12-901 (1983); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 5206(a) (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1983); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 815.20 (1977).
96. See supra note 10.
97. 2A POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 406.7-406.10 (1981). The "head of family" designation
has been defined as any person who is responsible for the support of another family member. But
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must actually occupy it as their home. 98 Furthermore, an owner99 may
be required to have an ownership interest in the property'00 and a for-
mal declaration of the property as a homestead may be required.',
A homestead exemption, as distinguished from a homestead prop-
erty interest, limits the exemption either in terms of value 0 2 or in terms
of size' 03 or in terms of both value and size.' 04 A homestead which
exceeds the exemption either in value or in size would subject the ex-
cess above the exemption value or size to the claims of creditors. 0 5
Essentially, the homestead exemption protects the homesteader only to
the extent of the exempt value or size'0 6 unless the exemption also cre-
ates a present property interest in a spouse. The present property inter-
est vested in a spouse is one which continues "for the benefit of the
spouse surviving, so long as he or she continues to occupy such home-
stead, and of the children until the youngest child becomes 18 years of
age."' 1 7 Another form of present homestead interest is a vested estate
in land of which the spouse cannot be divested during her life except by
abandonment or voluntary conveyance in any legal manner. 0 8 In
either case the homestead right would continue to protect the spouse
and minor children until death or remarriage of the former and major-
ity or marriage of the latter at which time the property may be sold to
satisfy any debts "it might have been subject to had it not been ex-
see, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 12-901 (1983) which grants every individual a homestead exemp-
tion in real or personal property occupied by him or her as a residence.
98. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.80 (1952). Since the homestead exemption is in-
tended to protect the family dwelling, an exemption will protect both the land and the improve-
ments thereon so long as they are occupied as a residence.
99. Ownership per se is not required as a condition to create a homestead. A lessee who
occupies leased property will be able to claim a homestead exemption in that property. I AMERI-
CAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.83 (1952).
100. Haskins, Homestead Exemptions, 63 HARV. L.REV. 1289, 1293, 1295-96 (1950). The type
of interest required to create a homestead exemption is one which is capable of use as a home,
although an equitable interest can also give rise to a homestead exemption.
101. Id at 1297-98. The formal declaration serves to notify creditors that the property is ex-
empt from execution. Subsequent purchasers of the property would also have notice that a
spouse's consent would be required to convey the property.
102. See supra note 9.
103. See supra note 8.
104. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. X, § 205 (80 acres and not exceeding $2,000.00 in value).
105. 2A POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 406.12(4) (1981).
106. See, e.g., Chandler v. Pilley, 60-1 U.S.T.C. 9238 (Prob. Ct., Shelby County, Tenn.
1959). In Chandler, the state constitution provided for a homestead exemption in the amount of
$1,000.00. At the time of his death, decedent was indebted to the United States for delinquent
taxes in the amount of $165,440.53. From the proceeds of sale the court ordered that the surviving
spouse receive $608.88 which was a sum based upon the standard mortality table, in full settle-
ment of her homestead rights.
107. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 12-902 (1983).
108. Paddock v. Siemoneit, 147 Tex. 571, 218 S.W.2d 428, 436 (1949).
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empted property."' 10 9
APPLICATION OF STATE LAW IN THE DETERMINATION OF PROPERTY
INTERESTS OF A DELINQUENT TAXPAYER
In United States v. Bess,l" 0 the Supreme Court considered the di-
chotomy of federal and state law with regard to the collection of delin-
quent taxes from a non-delinquent spouse. The Internal Revenue
Service sought to recover, in equity, from the beneficiary of life insur-
ance policies the amount of federal income taxes owed by the insured
at the time of his death. Immediately prior to his death, Herman Bess
possessed eight life insurance policies which had a cash surrender value
of $3,362.53. These eight insurance policies named his wife as benefici-
ary and she received $63,576.95 in proceeds upon his death. At the
time of his death, Herman Bess was liable for federal income taxes
from the years 1945 to 1949. After applying all the assets of the estate
toward satisfaction of the tax liability, a total of $8,874.57 remained
owing. The Internal Revenue Service in an equitable action sought to
shift the unpaid tax liability to Mrs. Bess, as beneficiary of her hus-
band's life insurance policies. The trial court held the beneficiary liable
for the full amount of the delinquency. 1 1 On appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reduced the liability to an
amount equal to the cash surrender value of the life insurance policies
at the time of the insured's death. 1 2 The Supreme Court agreed with
the court of appeals' decision that the beneficiary was liable for the
insured's delinquent taxes in the amount of the cash surrender value of
the insurance policies.' 13 Though the lien enforcement provisions pro-
vided for the attachment of a lien on all property belonging to the de-
linquent taxpayer, 14 the Court looked to New Jersey law to determine
the property rights vested in the delinquent taxpayer at the time of his
death." 15 Under New Jersey law, the delinquent taxpayer did not have
any property or rights to property in the insurance proceeds, thus the
federal tax lien could not attach to them." 6 The Court, however, did
hold that under New Jersey law, the cash surrender value of the insur-
ance policies was "property" or "rights to property" to which a lien
109. 2A POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 406.12(10) (1981).
110. 357 U.S. 51 (1958).
111. 134 F.Supp. 467 (D.N.J. 1955).
112. 243 F.2d 675 (3d Cir. 1957).
113. Bess, 357 U.S. at 59.
114. I.R.C. § 3670 (1939).
115. Bess, 357 U.S. at 55-59.
116. Id. at 56.
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could attach.I 7 Even though New Jersey law exempted an insured's
cash surrender value from attachment by lien creditors, the Court con-
cluded that when state law created a property interest in the cash sur-
render value of an insurance policy, the property interest was sufficient
to satisfy the requirements of the lien enforcement provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code."18
Aquilino v. United States"9 amplified the decision in Bess. In
Aquilino, the Internal Revenue Service attempted to claim priority over
petitioner's mechanic's lien against a delinquent taxpayer. The
Supreme Court of New York, Special Term, on a motion for summary
judgment held that the government's tax lien was ineffective because it
had not been filed in the office designated by New York law for the
filing of liens against real property. 20 On appeal, the appellate divi-
sion affirmed on other grounds, namely that there was no debt due
from the property owner to the taxpayer to which the government's tax
lien could attach.' 2' Although the New York Court of Appeals re-
versed on the ground that the federal tax lien had taken effect prior to
the mechanic's lien, 22 the Supreme Court vacated the judgment.
23
Under the Court's reasoning, state law governed the determination of
the nature of the legal interest which the taxpayer had in the property
sought to be reached by the tax lien. 124 A finding by a court that a
taxpayer held a property interest under state law would allow the at-
tachment of a federal tax lien and priority would be determined ac-
cording to federal law. 125 The application of state law in determining
the property interest to which federal consequences could attach was
viewed as a traditional function delegated to the state and as necessary
for the uniform administration of the federal revenue statutes. 26 The
doctrine established by Bess and Aquilino that state law governs the
determination of the nature of the property interest held by the delin-
117. Id. Essentially the lien attached to the cash surrender value immediately prior to the
delinquent taxpayer's death.
118. Id. at 56-57.
119. 363 U.S. 509 (1960).
120. 140 N.Y.S.2d 355 (1955).
121. 2 A.D.2d 747, 153 N.Y.S.2d 268 (1956).
122. 3 N.Y.2d 511, 146 N.E.2d 774, 169 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1957).
123. Aquilino, 363 U.S. at 515-16.
124. Id. at 513, quoting, Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 82 (1940).
125. Id at 514.
126. Id. Not only did the Court view the application of state law to the determination of
property interests as a traditional and necessary function, but it also rejected the suggestion, as
unsound, that the definition of a taxpayer's property interest should be governed by federal law.
Aquilino, 363 U.S. at 513, n.3.
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quent taxpayer has consistently been applied by the federal courts. 127
UNITED STATES V RODGERS
Facts of the Case
In 1971 and 1972, the Internal Revenue Service issued assessments
against Philip S. Bosco totalling more than $900,000.00. The assess-
ments were issued to collect federal wagering taxes, penalties and inter-
est for the taxable years 1966-1971. These taxes remained unpaid at
the time of Bosco's death in 1974. In September 1977, the government
filed suit under I.R.C. Section 7402128 and 7403129 seeking to reduce to
judgment the assessments against Bosco; to enforce its tax liens includ-
ing the one that had attached to Bosco's interest in the residence; and to
obtain a deficiency judgment in the amount of any unsatisfied judg-
ment. 30 At the time that the government sought to enforce its lien,
Lucille Mitzi Bosco Rodgers, the widow of Philip S. Bosco, was resid-
ing and occupying the homestead that was acquired as community
property. At the time the assessment was made, only Philip S. Bosco
was liable for delinquent taxes. Lucille Bosco Rodgers' status re-
mained a non-delinquent taxpayer's spouse. The United States District
Court for the Northern District of Texas granted partial summary
judgment on Rodgers' claim that federal tax liens could not defeat a
non-delinquent taxpayer spouse's state created right not to have her
homestead subjected to a forced sale to satisfy the lien that had at-
tached to Bosco's interest in the home. 131 Although a forced sale was
precluded, the government was given the option of either enforcing its
lien by waiting until Mrs. Rodgers' homestead interest lapsed by death,
abandonment or conveyance or by selling Philip Bosco's interest in the
property. 
32
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit 133 held that the tax liens attached only to the taxpayer's interest in
the homestead property with the interest of the non-taxpayer spouse
127. See infra note 207.
128. I.R.C. § 7402 (1977) provided for the jurisdiction of federal district courts in civil actions
"to render such judgments and decrees as may be necessary or appropriate for the enforcement of
the internal revenue laws."
129. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
130. Rodgers, 103 S.Ct. at 2139.
131. Id.
132. Id at 2140. It is questionable if a lien would give rise to incidents of ownership which
would entitle the government to sell the delinquent taxpayer's interest. See infra notes 208-210
and accompanying text.
133. United States v. Rodgers, 649 F.2d 1117 (5th Cir. 1981).
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remaining free of any tax liens. ' 34 Applying Texas law the court found
that a present property interest in the homestead existed, thus the fed-
eral tax lien could not result in foreclosure against homestead property
as long as the non-taxpayer spouse's interest therein existed under state
law. 135
In another case decided with Rodgers that was legally comparable
but factually distinct, the Supreme Court held that state homestead
rights did not prevent the sale of homestead property where there was
joint income tax liability. 36 In Ingram v. City of Dallas Dept. of Hous-
ing and Urban Rehabilitation,37 the Internal Revenue Service assessed
Donald Ingram, individually, for unpaid withholding taxes in 1972 and
1973. In 1973, Donald and Joerene Ingram were jointly assessed for
unpaid personal income taxes. In 1975, at about the same time that the
Ingrams were seeking a divorce, their homestead property was de-
stroyed by fire. This property later became the subject matter of the
Internal Revenue Service's action to enforce its lien against the pro-
ceeds of sale under I.R.C. Section 7403.138
Unlike Rodgers, the court of appeals in Ingram allowed the fore-
closure of the lien to satisfy the tax liability despite the fact that Texas
law created a property interest in the homestead.139 Although different
conclusions were reached based on similar facts, Ingram involved indi-
vidual and joint tax liability, while Rodgers involved individual tax lia-
bility. The decision of the court of appeals in Ingram did not totally
ignore the property interest created by Texas law, with regard to the
joint liability, homestead rights did not act as a bar to foreclosure of the
134. Id at 1123.
135. Id. at 1124-25.
136. Rodgers, 103 S.Ct. at 2152.
137. 649 F.2d at 1128 (5th Cir. 1981).
138. Ingram differed from Rodgers due to the circumstances surrounding the government's
attempt to enforce its lien under Section 7403. In Ingram, as part of the property settlement
entered into, Joerene Ingram was entitled to receive her ex-husband's interest in the real property
(homestead) in exchange for $1,500.00. The $1,500.00 payment was to be made from the proceeds
of sale, which was never accomplished because of the federal tax liens encumbering the property.
Acting under the threat that the property would be leveled if not brought up to the city code,
Joerene Ingram brought an action against the City of Dallas Department of Housing & Urban
Rehabilitation to quiet title to the property, to remove the federal tax liens and to enjoin demoli-
tion. The Internal Revenue Service removed the suit to the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas. Following removal, the government filed a counter-claim against the
Ingrains seeking to recover the individual and joint liability for unpaid taxes. Eventually the
property was sold under Section 7403 and the proceeds were deposited into the registry of the
district court. On motion for summary judgment, the government was granted its counter-claim.
The difference between Ingram and Rodgers is two-fold; the implied abandonment of the home-
stead following the fire and the fact that the Ingrams were jointly liable for unpaid personal in-
come taxes.
139. Ingram, 649 F.2d at 1131-32.
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lien on homestead property. 40 Relying on Rodgers, the court held that
homestead rights protected the non-taxpayer spouse's interest from
foreclosure when the lien existed against only one spouse.'
4'
Certiorari was granted1 42 in order to resolve a conflict among the
courts of appeals as to the proper interpretation of I.R.C. Section 7403
and its effect on state homestead rights or exemptions. 43 Rodgers was
reversed and remanded for further consideration with regard to a fore-
closure of the lien on the homestead and for a valuation of Lucille
Rodgers' interest in the property. 144  Ingram was vacated and
remanded. 145
Reasoning of the Court
The Court in Rodgers considered the issue of whether I.R.C. Sec-
tion 7403 empowered a federal district court to order the sale of a fam-
ily home in which a delinquent taxpayer had an interest at the time that
the indebtedness arose and in which the non-delinquent taxpayer's
spouse also held a separate "homestead" right as defined by state law.
The Court held that in no instance would a state homestead right pre-
vent the sale of the homestead to satisfy a federal tax lien. 146 In order
to avoid significant difficulties under the due process clause of the fifth
amendment, the Court provided that the non-delinquent spouse was
entitled to so much of the distribution of proceeds provided for under
I.R.C. Section 7403 as represents complete compensation for the loss of
the homestead estate. 147 The Court reached this conclusion by first ex-
amining the relationship between the lien and enforcement provisions
of the Code. Next the Court examined the effect of homestead rights as
a bar to a forced sale under I.R.C. Section 7403. Then the Court con-
sidered the due process requirements with regard to providing a non-
delinquent spouse with adequate compensation for the loss of home-
stead property. Before providing guidelines to be followed by federal
district courts in I.R.C. Section 7403 actions, the Court realized that
I.R.C. Section 7403 was discretionary in its application. The discre-
140. Id.
141. Id at 1132.
142. 456 U.S. 904 (1982). A single petition for writ of certiorari was filed pursuant to Sup. CT.
R. 19.4 (1983). Rule 19.4 provides that "[W]hen two or more cases are sought to be reviewed on
certiorari to the same court and involve the identical or closely related questions, it will suffice to
file a single petition for writ of certiorari covering all the cases."
143. See supra notes 78-91 and accompanying text.
144. Rodgers, 103 S.Ct. at 2152.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 2136.
147. Id
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tionary application of I.R.C. Section 7403 would give rise to a balanc-
ing by the courts of the individual, government and third party
interests before ordering a sale of the property.
In Rodgers, the lower court held that the property, to which a fed-
eral tax lien attached under I.R.C. Section 6321, would be subject to
enforcement of the lien under I.R.C. Section 7403(a) but only to the
extent of the taxpayer's interest in the property. 148 The Supreme Court
agreed that a lien under I.R.C. Section 6321 did not extend beyond the
delinquent taxpayer's interest 49 but that under I.R.C. Sections 7403(a)
and 7403(b) 150 a district court was authorized to enforce its lien against
whatever property was owned by the taxpayer without regard to the
extent of ownership in that property. 151 Together with I.R.C. Section
7403(c), 152 the Court interpreted the statute to provide the authority to
sell the property in its entirety and not to restrict the sale to the tax-
payer's interest therein. 1
53
The Court based its interpretation on the predecessor statute to
I.R.C. Section 7403. At the state level in rem proceedings were em-
ployed not only to satisfy a delinquency that arose from ad valorem
property taxes, 154 but also to extinguish the interests of other non-delin-
quent owners. The court interpreted the predecessor statute 5 5 to
I.R.C. Section 7403 as creating the same type of in rem rights in the
federal government. Adjudication of all matters involved as well as the
determination of all claims and liens upon the property provided
greater protection than in rem proceedings, but at the federal level, the
tax did not arise from property ownership and therefore it was neces-
sary to protect the rights of third parties. 156 In the event that third
party interests are converted into cash proceeds following a foreclosure
under I.R.C. Section 7403, compensation to the third party interest
148. Rodgers, 649 F.2d at 1125.
149. Rodgers, 103 S.Ct. at 2141.
150. I.R.C. §§ 7403(a) and (b) (1984).
151. I.R.C. § 7403(a) provides that to enforce its lien the government may subject any property
of the delinquent, in which he has any right, title, or interest to payment of such tax or liability
(emphasis added). I.R.C. § 7403 (b) provides for the joinder, as parties, of all persons having liens
upon or claiming any interest in the property involved.
152. I.R.C. § 7403(c) (1984) allows the district court to adjudicate all matters involved and to
finally determine the merits of all claims to and liens upon the property.
153. Rodgers, 103 S.Ct. at 2142-43.
154. Ad valorem property taxes are those taxes "levied on property or an article of commerce
in proportion to its value, as determined by assessment or appraisal." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
48 (5th ed. 1979).
155. See, 15 Stat. ch. 186 (1868).
156. Rodgers, 103 S.Ct. at 2143.
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holders is provided for in I.R.C. Section 7403(c). 157 Third party com-
pensation would be based upon the relative interests held by the third
parties, and the United States would receive the proceeds of sale pro-
portional to the interest held by the delinquent taxpayer.
5 8
In an effort to provide guidance for the district courts, 159 the Court
provided a hypothetical formula that could be applied in determination
of just compensation for the taking of a third party's property. 60 The
illustration provided assumed that a homestead estate was an economic
equivalent of a life estate and it also assumed that a non-delinquent
spouse would continue to occupy the homestead property until
death. 16 1 According to that illustration, if a federal tax lien resulted in
foreclosure against the homestead property, the non-delinquent spouse
would be entitled to most of the proceeds of sale as compensation,
62
the government receiving a minimal amount.
163
In summary, having concluded that I.R.C. Sections 6321 and 7403
provide for the sale of the homestead in its entirety so long as third
157. The "taking" of a property interest is compensated by way of a distribution of the pro-
ceeds of sale according to the interest of the parties and of the United States. I.R.C. § 7403(c)
(1984). See supra notes 65-77 and accompanying text regarding the priority of federal tax liens
over other liens.
158. Rodgers, 103 S.Ct. at 2144.
159. The method of distribution required by I.R.C. § 7403 was not before the court in either
Rodgers or Ingram.
160. Id. at 2145-46. The Court seemingly confused third party interests with homestead inter-
ests. Third parties are compensated according to the findings of the court in respect of the inter-
ests according to Section 7403(c). Homestead interests created under state law will result in
separate and distinct computation of the amount of compensation.
161. The Court's illustration used an 8% discount to calculate the value of the "life estate" for
three hypothetical non-delinquent surviving spouses, aged 30, 50, and 70 years, each holding a
homestead estate.
162. Under the Court's illustration an 8% discount rate was applied in calculating the value of
the economic life estate. Assuming, for example, that the homestead property was worth $100,000,
the annual income from the property would be $8000 ($100,000 multiplied by 8%). If the non-
delinquent spouse was age 30 at the time, approximately 97% of the proceeds of sale would be due
as compensation for the homestead estate. (The multiplier for an immediate whole life annuity at
8% for an individual, aged 30 is 12.1774. This factor multiplied by $8000 yields $97,419 or 97% of
the total homestead value). The compensation assumes that the non-delinquent spouse would
accept payment of a lump sum in commutation of a right to income for life.
163. The Court based its illustration on ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-705 (Supp. 1983). The statute
provides for the computation of an immediate whole life annuity which assumes that a lump sum
will be paid in commutation of a right to income for life. Applying this principle to a homestead
situation, would view the right to occupy a homestead giving rise to an annual stream of income in
an amount equal to the homestead value. Once an annual valuation is determined, a mechanical
computation results in the amount of compensation due to the non-delinquent spouse. See also,
Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-10 (1984). In his dissent, Blackmun, J., questioned the presentation of this
illustration as a possible means of compensation to the non-delinquent spouse. According to Jus-
tice Blackmun, allowing the non-delinquent spouse to retain her possession of the property until
the homestead interest was extinguished by death, abandonment or conveyance would yield the
government an amount not significantly different from the yield under the majority's approach.
Rodgers, 103 S.Ct. at 2158-59 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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parties received just compensation, the Court reasoned that full appli-
cation of I.R.C. Section 7403 was proper. 164 The basis provided for
reaching this conclusion was that I.R.C. Section 7403 was more advan-
tageous to the government than other remedies. Among the advan-
tages mentioned were that the government could seek the highest
return possible through a sale of the entire interest in the homestead
property. 165 Although a greater return would necessarily follow from
the sale of an entire interest, the government was not assured that it
would receive greater proceeds from the sale. 166 In terms of non-gov-
ernment advantages mentioned were the protection of third party rights
by allowing them to receive just compensation and the assurance that
the government will not receive more from the proceeds than an
amount proportional to the delinquent taxpayer's interest. 1
67
The court of appeals in both Rodgers and Ingram held that be-
cause the Texas homestead laws granted special protections, the home-
stead property was immunized from the reach of I.R.C. Section
7403.168 Although earlier decisions held that state law would govern
the nature of property interests or rights held by the delinquent tax-
payer, 169 the Supreme Court chose to ignore prior precedent and, in-
stead, relied on the interpretation given I.R.C. Section 7403 in the court
of appeals' cases of United States v. Overman170 and Herndon v. United
States.17 1 In both Overman and Herndon, state law was found to be an
ineffective bar against foreclosure against the entire property interest.
The Court found further support for the premise that state homestead
rights could not prevent I.R.C. Section 7403 from reaching the entire
property interest. Under the supremacy clause, 172 federal law would
preempt state law. 173 As long as the non-delinquent property owners
received adequate compensation for their property loss, "no further
deference to state law [was] required, either by [Section] 7403 or by the
Constitution."174
Under I.R.C. Section 7403, although certain provisions are
164. Rodgers, 103 S.Ct. at 2145.
165. Id.
166. See supra note 163.
167. Rodgers, 103 S.Ct. at 2145.
168. Rodgers, 649 F.2d at 1127; Ingram, 649 F.2d at 1132.
169. Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509 (1960); United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958).
170. 424 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1970).
171. 501 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1974).
172. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
173. Rodgers, 103 S.Ct. at 2147.
174. Id.
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mandatory in their application, 175 the courts have discretionary author-
ity to authorize a sale of homestead property. Upon adjudication of all
matters and determination of the merits, a court may decree the sale of
homestead property. The Court realized that a forced sale was not ab-
solutely required in all instances, 176 but there were virtually no circum-
stances in which it would be permissible to refuse authorization of a
sale simply to protect the interests of a delinquent taxpayer, let alone
the interests of third parties.177 Because there were virtually no circum-
stances where a court could not force a sale of homestead property to
satisfy a tax lien, the Court provided four factors to be considered
before ordering a sale of property. 78 First, consideration should be
given to the extent to which the government's financial interest would
be prejudiced by a sale of only the delinquent taxpayer's interest in the
property. 179 Second, applying state law, a court should consider what,
if any, legally recognized expectations a third party would have in the
property so that a partial interest in the property would not be sold. 80
Third, prejudice to a non-delinquent third party such as dislocation
costs and the potential that the party will be under compensated must
also be considered.' 8' Finally, a court should consider the relative




In his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun 83 concluded that
I.R.C. Section 7403 conferred only the authority to sell jointly owned
property to the extent that the taxpayer's interest would allow him to so
175. A court is required to adjudicate all matters involved with regard to the lien enforcement
and to determine the merits of all claims and liens upon the property.
176. Rodgers, 103 S.Ct. at 2149.
177. Id. at 2151.
178. Id at 2151-52.
179. Id. at 2151. Among the factors to be considered are fair market value and the inability to
obtain at least one-half that amount in a forced sale of a one-half interest in a homestead estate.
In those instances where the proceeds of sale would exceed the amount of delinquency, no
prejudice to the government's financial interest would result. Id at 2151, n. 40.
180. Id. For example, would a cotenant be able to partition the property or to resist a
partition.
181. Id. at 2152. Assuming that courts will follow the Court's computation illustration, under
compensation will be prevalent. The use of actuarial tables to determine amounts of compensa-
tion due to third parties in certain instances results in disparate treatment. Id. at 2148.
182. Id. at 2152. Absence of a present possessory interest would allow for a forced sale, but
where a non-delinquent taxpayer possessed a majority interest in the property, a forced sale would
not be advisable.
183. Id. at 2152-61, Blackmun, J., dissenting. The dissent concurred in part with the holding
that Section 7403 grants the power to sell property not belonging to the taxpayer in limited
situations.
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do in the absence of a forced tax sale. 184 The dissent also believed that
where a non-delinquent taxpayer enjoyed an indestructible state prop-
erty right, the property right was an effective bar against a forced sale
entitling the non-delinquent taxpayer to continue in possession of the
lien property. 85 The dissent reached its conclusions by first examining
the rights that a lienholder enjoyed at common law. Next the broad
interpretation given Mansfield v. Excelsior Refining Co.,186 which the
majority stated was "on all fours" with its holding in Rodgers,187 was
criticized. Finally, the dissent suggested that the result of recognizing
state property rights as a bar against foreclosure of a federal tax lien
would not yield a different result than non-recognition of state property
rights and yet greater protections are provided to the non-delinquent
taxpayer.1
88
At common law a lienholder had no greater rights in property than
the debtor himself had at the time that the lien arose. 189 The rights that
the debtor held in the property were determined according to state
property law and the debtor would merely step into the delinquent tax-
payer's shoes.190 This interpretation that the government assumed no
greater rights than the tax debtor held was consistent with commenta-
ries that stated that state property rights would govern the position the
government took with regard to its interest in the lien property.' 9'
Since Texas law conferred an absolute right of use and possession of
the homestead property for life, it would reason that the federal tax
collector stepped into the tax debtor's shoes and assumed his rights in
the property. Under this assumption, Lucille Rodgers was entitled to
an absolute right of use and possession and the federal government's
lien on one-half of the property was subordinate to Rodgers' home-
stead right.
92
Although the majority interpreted Manfifeld v. Excelsior Refining
184. Id at 2153.
185. Id
186. 135 U.S. 326 (1890).
187. Rodgers, 103 S.Ct. at 2142, n. 17. The Court did not rest its decision on a broad reading
of Man ifeld, but it found Rodgers to be "on all fours" with the decision in Mansfield
188. Id at 2158-59.
189. Id at 2153.
190. Id
191. See, e.g., Anderson, Federal Tax Liens-Their Nature and Priority, 41 CALIF. L.REv. 241,
250 (1953); Clark, Federal Tax Liens and Their Enforcement, 33 VA. L.REv. 13, 17 (1947); Reid,
Tax Liens, Their Operation andEffect, 9 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 563, 568 (1951). In these articles
a common premise is that the tax lienor takes no greater rights than those possessed by the tax
debtor, with the tax debtor's rights determined according to state law. See, PLUMB, FEDERAL TAX
LIENs 38 (1972).
192. Rodgers, 103 S.Ct. at 2155.
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Co.193 to stand for the contention that the government could seek a
judicial sale of the entire property interest under I.R.C. Section 7403
and its predecessor, t94 the dissent viewed the majority's interpretation
of Manfieldas expanding the reach of I.R.C. Section 7403 beyond real
and personal property interests to include equitable interests in real
property held by delinquent third parties. 195 Under the majority's
broad interpretation of Mansfield, the government would necessarily
possess greater rights in the property than the tax debtor possessed at
common law and the dissent found no prior precedent to support such
expansion of governmental power.'
96
Finally, the dissent addressed the probable results that would arise
from the majority's interpretation that I.R.C. Section 7403 assured
prompt and certain collection of delinquent taxes by a forced sale of
property held by the taxpayer. Allowing a taxpayer to assert state
property rights would not impede the certain collection of delinquent
taxes, but the collection would not be prompt. 97 Certainty of collec-
tion is provided under I.R.C. Section 7403(d) which allows for the ap-
pointment of a receiver during the pendency of the lien to supervise the
property and to protect the government's interest in the property.
98
Furthermore, certainty of collection in terms of the amount that the
government could realize from the proceeds would be equivalent to the
discounted present value of the property value. 199 Recognizing state
property rights in homestead property would yield an amount
equivalent to an amount that would be recognized from a forced sale.
Federal recognition of state homestead rights as a bar against lien en-
forcement would be consistent with the rights that the debtor held in
the property. Since a lienholder would take no greater rights than the
debtor held in the property, the federal government would not be able
to foreclose on the property to satisfy its lien against a non-delinquent
193. 135 U.S. 326 (1890).
194. Rodgers, 103 S.Ct. at 2141, n. 17. In AMansfield the Court addressed the issue of whether
by way of an administrative levy the government could sell property owned by a non-delinquent
third party. Although the property owner's waiver gave the government priority over all claims to
the property and full title in the event of a foreclosure, the Court held that the waiver provided no
more than a right to sell the property by way of a judicial sale. Mansfielg 135 U.S. at 340.
195. Rodgers, 103 S.Ct. at 2158. Because Section 7403 allows for the enforcement of a federal
tax lien against any interest held by the taxpayer, the dissent reasoned that a judicial sale could
occur when, for example, a tenant failed to pay his taxes, or where a holder of an easement failed
to pay his taxes, or where a condominium or cooperative owner failed to pay his taxes. The
government admitted that this outcome was in fact possible. Id. at 2158, n. 13.
196. Id. at 2158.
197. Id at 2158-59.
198. Id at 2159.
199. Id.
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taxpayer's property interest. 2°°
ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court agreed to hear Rodgers to resolve the conflict
that existed among the circuits. Before Rodgers, it was unclear how
state law would affect the enforcement of a federal tax lien where only
one party was delinquent and the other party claimed some right to the
lien property as created by state law. Prior to discussing the impact of
Rodgers on state homestead laws, it is necessary to examine the dichot-
omy that the courts found to exist between federal and state law. This
will lead to a conclusion that the Court reached the wrong conclusion
in Rodgers. The majority opinion, though it considered all the relevant
factors, is inconsistent in the conclusions that it reached. On the one
hand it recognized state property rights and on the other it provided
that the rights could be ignored. Furthermore, the Court provided for
just compensation to non-delinquent third parties based on state de-
fined property rights and yet the illustrated method of compensation
limited the amount of compensation that the government will recover
from the proceeds. The majority further extended the power to apply
the enforcement procedure to any type of property interest held by a
third party in contradistinction to the Internal Revenue Service's own
interpretation of the reach of I.R.C. Section 7403. A more reasoned
approach to the extent of power vested in the federal government under
I.R.C. Section 7403 is presented by the dissenting opinion.
In United States v. Bess201 the Supreme Court examined the di-
chotomy of federal and state law with regard to the collection of delin-
quent taxes from a non-delinquent spouse. Although this case did not
arise in the context of a lien upon homestead property, the Court held
that since the federal tax lien created no property rights but merely
attached federal consequences to rights created under state law, it was
necessary to examine the property rights in terms of state law.20 2 A
finding of sufficient rights in property under state law was necessary
before attachment of federal tax liens could occur.20 3 The precedent of
Bess was not followed by the Rodgers Court. Based upon the fact that
the Court allowed a forced sale of the entire property, it is clear that the
200. This assumes that only one taxpayer is delinquent. If both taxpayers are delinquent, then
according to Ingram the government would be able to subject the interests of both taxpayers to a
forced sale under Section 7403.
201. 357 U.S. 51 (1958).
202. Id. at 55.
203. Id at 56-57.
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Court viewed the federal tax lien as giving rise to property rights under
which a forced partition could occur. Under the Bess rationale, the
federal tax lien merely would attach federal consequences to the state
property right, with attachment of the federal tax lien occurring only if
there were sufficient rights in the property and then only to the extent
or value of those rights. Applying the Rodgers rationale, as long as the
delinquent taxpayer possessed some property rights, the federal gov-
ernment could attach those rights and exercise rights of ownership itself
over the property in its entirety. Seemingly, under Bess, a homestead
would create sufficient rights in the property but the attachment of the
federal tax lien would affect only the delinquent taxpayer's interest in
the property and not the entire property as Rodgers held.
Aquilino v. United States2°4 amplified the decision in Bess. In
Aquilino, the Court held that state law controls the determination of the
legal interest which the delinquent taxpayer had in the property to be
subjected to a federal tax lien. 205 The Court viewed the application of
state law in determining the property interest as a traditional role dele-
gated to the state and as necessary for the uniform administration of
the federal revenue statutes.206
Adhering to the Bess-Aquilino doctrine federal courts have consist-
ently held that state law controls the nature of the legal interest in the
property. 207 While courts have agreed that state law controls the deter-
mination of the property interests held by the taxpayer, there has been
disagreement over the enforcement of federal tax liens in light of the
interests created under state law. Even in the area of lien enforcement,
the Bess-Aquilino doctrine applied based on the nature of the state
property right and its incidents of ownership.
In Folsom v. United States,208 the government sought to enforce its
lien against a one-sixth undivided interest in property owned by the
taxpayer. Although the trial court ordered a public sale of the jointly
204. 363 U.S. 509 (1960).
205. Id at 512-13, quoting, Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 82 (1940).
206. Id. at 514. In his dissent, Justice Harlan agreed that under Bess the uniform application
of federal tax liens did not require the courts to disregard state property concepts. Id at 519
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
207. See, e.g., Tillery v. Parks, 630 F.2d 775, 776-77 (10th Cir. 1980); Herndon v. United
States, 501 F.2d 1219, 1220-21 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Hershberger, 475 F.2d 677, 681
(10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Kocher, 468 F.2d 503, 505-06 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 931 (1973); Shaw v. United States, 331 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1964); United States v. Brown, 81-2
U.S.T.C. 9481 (N.D.W.Va. 1981); In re American Business Machs., 80-2 U.S.T.C. 9684
(D.Nev. 1980); In re Sotelo, 76-1 U.S.T.C. 9435 (S.D.III. 1976); First Nat'l Bank of Cartersville
v. Hill, 412 F.Supp. 422, 424 (N.D.Ga. 1976).
208. 306 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1962).
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owned property,20 9 the appellate court held that a lienholder did not
own or possess the incidents of property ownership necessary to sup-
port a partition of the property.210 This decision was consistent with
Aquilino in that state law determined the property rights and federal
law governed enforcement of tax liens. Absent an ownership interest in
property, as defined under state law, there were no means available to
enforce the tax lien.
Enforcement of federal tax liens when state homestead rights were
involved also resulted in the application of the Bess-Aquilino doctrine.
The courts that were confronted with state homestead rights as defenses
against the enforcement of federal tax liens distinguished the state right
into three categories: marital rights, exemptions or privileges, and pres-
ent property interests.
In Weitzner v. United States2l the court held that a federal tax lien
was valid and enforceable against homestead property. 212 Construing
Florida's homestead provisions21 3 the court found that marital rights
were created to protect the head of a family by securing a shelter for
him and the members of his family.214 The marital rights arose from a
marital relationship where property was owned and occupied by the
family at the time of death; a husband and wife relationship existed at
the time of death; and the wife survived her husband.215 In the form of
marital rights, the surviving spouse had no property rights that would
prevent the enforcement of a tax lien against the property claimed as
the homestead.2
1 6
Exemptions and privileges are another form of state homestead
rights. Like marital rights, exemptions and privileges provide no pro-
tection against enforcement of federal tax liens. In United States v.
Heffron,217 even though community property was in question, Califor-
nia's homestead exemption did not preclude an attachment of a federal
tax lien upon the entire homestead. Similarly, in Shaw v. United
States,218 the court held that a husband's joint tenancy interest was sub-
ject to attachment of a federal tax lien, but only to the extent of the
209. Id. at 363-64.
210. Id. at 367-68.
211. 309 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1962) cert. denied 372 U.S. 913 (1963).
212. Id. at 48.
213. FLA. CONST. art. X; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 731.27, 731.05 and 731.34.
214. Weitzner, 309 F.2d at 48.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. 158 F.2d 657 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 331 U.S. 831 (1947).
218. 331 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1964). Accor4 Aronow v. United States, 65-2 U.S.T.C. 9692
(D.Mont. 1965).
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delinquent taxpayer's interest.219 In United States v. Overman,220 the
court bifurcated the taxpayer spouse's community property into sepa-
rate elements, namely, the taxpayer's interest and that which be held in
real property owned in community with his wife. Applying I.R.C. Sec-
tion 6321, the taxpayer's interest in property was subject to lien because
it constituted rights to property under state law. 22' The taxpayer's com-
munity interest was also susceptible to attachment by the federal tax
lien but only to the extent of his one-half interest in the community
property. 222 Washington state law 223 created an exemption that was
ineffective against the enforcement of federal tax liens. 224 Although
Rodgers involved a Texas statute and constitutional provisions that cre-
ated a vested property interest, these cases are important because they
reveal that state property rights govern the rights that the federal gov-
ernment took in the lien property.
United States v. Hershberge225 involved a Kansas law226 that cre-
ated a present property interest in the non-delinquent spouse. Under
Kansas law, a homestead consisted of one acre of land located within
city limits if occupied as a family residence. As interpreted by Kansas
state courts, the homestead provisions created an existing estate in the
homestead which granted the taxpayer's spouse an immediate enjoy-
ment in the homestead property. 227 The Hershberger court distin-
guished itself from Shaw and Weitzner on the grounds that Kansas law
expressly provided for a present property interest, while in Shaw and
Weitzner state homestead laws conferred privileges and exemptions
only. When an indivisible and vested interest in homestead property
existed, the property could not be subjected to levy and sale to satisfy
the delinquent spouse's federal tax liability 228 so long as the non-delin-
quent spouse continued to meet the state homestead requirements.229
Although the Kansas Constitution provided that a homestead was not
exempt from the sale for taxes,230 the sale was limited to those instances
where the tax arose against the property involved and not to satisfy any
219. Id at 497. Accorg United States v. Overman, 424 F.2d 1142, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 1970);
Carter v. United States ex rel. D.I.R., 399 F.2d 340, 341 (5th Cir. 1968).
220. 424 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1970).
221. Id. at 1145.
222. Id. at 1146-47.
223. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.16.010, 26.16.020, and 26.16.030.
224. Overman 424 F.2d at 1145-46.
225. 475 F.2d 677 (10th Cir. 1973).
226. KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 9. See also, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2301 (1964).
227. Hershberger, 475 F.2d at 680, citing, Helm v. Helm, 11 Kan. 19 (1873).
228. Id at 682, quoting, Jones v. Kemp, 144 F.2d 478 (10th Cir. 1944).
229. Id., citing, Morgan v. Moynahan, 86 F.Supp. 522 (S.D.Tex. 1949).
230. KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 9.
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other type of tax liability incurred by the owner.23'
In light of Rodgers, the interpretation of the Kansas homestead
law in Hershberger is crucial to a proper interpretation and analysis of
Rodgers and is necessary to reach a conclusion that the holding in Rod-
gers was incorrect. Hershberger adhered to the Bess-Aquilino doctrine
and examined the property interest that existed under state law. Kan-
sas law created an indivisible interest in the property which acted as a
bar against the enforcement of the federal tax lien. One commentator
concluded that recognition of state property rights as a bar against en-
forcement of federal tax liens would delegate the power to the states to
not only determine what property rights existed in homestead property,
but also to determine whether the federal government can enforce its
lien against delinquent taxpayers. 232 The misconception in this line of
reasoning is that state law would forever bar enforcement of federal tax
liens. The problem is not whether, but rather, when the federal govern-
ment will be able to enforce its tax liens.
As both the majority and dissent recognized, adequate compensa-
tion would have to be provided to the non-delinquent spouse for the
deprivation of her homestead estate. 233 Under the majority's illustra-
tion, the government would recover but a small fraction of the proceeds
where a non-delinquent spouse held a vested property interest.234 Ap-
plying the dissent's method of allowing the non-delinquent taxpayer to
retain possession of the lien property would yield the same result in
terms of the present value of the proceeds of sale. Furthermore, al-
lowing the non-delinquent taxpayer to retain possession and use of the
property would result in uniform application of the enforcement provi-
sions of the Code. As the Internal Revenue Service recognized, when
owners of partial undivided interests in property became delinquent,
the lien would attach only to the taxpayer's interest and a forced sale
would not result.235 Allowing the non-taxpayer spouse to retain posses-
sion would be consistent with the Internal Revenue Service's treatment
231. Hershberger, 338 F.Supp. 804, 808 (D.Kan. 1972). The in rem nature of such proceedings
was also discussed in Rodgers, 103 S.Ct. at 2143. The Court compared the effect of in rem pro-
ceedings at the state level to the predecessor statute to Section 7403. Application of in rem pro-
ceedings against a taxpayer's real property to satisfy federal tax liability would allow the federal
tax collector to have some of the same advantages enjoyed at the state level in tax enforcement.
Rodgers, 103 S.Ct. at 2142-43. See also, Rogge, The Tax Lien ofthe United States, 13 A.B.A.J.
576, 577 (1927).
232. Note, Federal Tax Lien--Is It Effective Against a Slate Homestead Exemption, 52 N.C.L.
REv. 695, 698 (1974).
233. Rodgers, 103 S.Ct. at 2144-45, 2159.
234. Id at 2144-45.
235. Rev. Rul. 79-55, 1979-1 C.B. 400, 401.
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of partial undivided property interests in property and the amount of
proceeds recovered would not be significantly different than those real-
ized from an immediate sale of the homestead.
Further proof that the Court reached the wrong conclusion in
Rodgers is the reliance on cases that did not involve homestead prop-
erty interests. The Court's conclusion that the government could seek
the sale of the entire property under I.R.C. Section 7403 was premised
on lower court decisions that concerned the sale of jointly held prop-
erty to satisfy the tax liability of one of the joint owners. 236 Where joint
ownership of property exists, the four unities of ownership-possession,
interest, title and time, also exist, and the interest of the delinquent
taxpayer could be subject to foreclosure. 237 With a homestead interest,
only the unity of possession exists and a forced sale of the entire home-
stead interest cannot arise from the unity of possession alone.238 The
unity of possession together with some legal interest in the property
may give rise to a lien upon the homestead interest, but this lien would
not affect the rights of others in the homestead. 239 Essentially, the
lienholder would step into the debtor's shoes and assume the debtor's
interest and rights in the property. Since a homestead could not be
conveyed without the consent of both the lienholder and the non-delin-
quent spouse a forced sale could not occur.
The Court provided an illustration to demonstrate the computa-
tion of compensation due to the non-delinquent spouse for the taking
of the homestead property. 24° The problems that can arise from the
application of this illustration include valuation and compensation
problems. In terms of valuation, fair market value should be applied,
but the district court would only have the proceeds of sale available for
distribution. Because a forced sale arises from the enforcement of a
federal tax lien, a willing buyer and a willing seller necessary to arrive
at fair market value would not be parties to the sale.24' In the absence
236. United States v. Kocher, 468 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied 411 U.S. 931 (1973);
United States v. Overman, 424 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1970); Washington v. United States, 402 F.2d 3
(4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied 402 U.S. 978 (1971); United States v. Trilling, 328 F.2d 699 (7th Cir.
1964).
237. Brief for Respondent at 25, cited in, United States v. Rodgers, 103 S.Ct. 2132 (1983).
238. Id. at 25-26.
239. 1 JONES, LAw OF LIENS, § 9 (1888).
240. Rodgers, 103 S.Ct. at 2145.
241. Fair market value is the "price at which property would change hands in a transaction
between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under compulsion to buy nor to sell and
both being informed' of all the relevant circumstances. Palmer v. Commissioner, 523 F.2d 1308,
1310 (8th Cir. 1975) (emphasis added), quoting Hamm v. Commissioner, 325 F.2d 934, 937 (8th
Cir. 1963), cert. denied 377 U.S. 993 (1964), quoting O'Malley v. Ames, 197 F.2d 256, 257 (8th Cir.
1952).
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of a willing buyer and seller needed to arrive at fair market value, even
under the three valuation approaches used by appraisers,24 2 a just com-
pensation to the non-delinquent spouse would not be yielded. Fair
market value would be known but the proceeds of sale would be sub-
ject to the district court's findings in respect to the interests of the par-
ties and the United States.
243
Further problems would arise from the application of actuarial ta-
bles to compute the compensation due to the non-delinquent taxpayer.
The application of actuarial tables provides the courts with a means to
determine the percentage of the proceeds due as just compensation to
the non-delinquent spouse. This computation assumes that the non-
delinquent spouse would accept a single lump sum payment in commu-
tation of a right to occupy the homestead for life. Furthermore, the
computation ignores the fact that under I.R.C. Section 7403(c) the pro-
ceeds are distributed in accordance with the claims and interests of all
parties and not to the non-delinquent taxpayer alone. In addition, the
possibility of out-living actuarial estimates and the rate of interest used
in conjunction with life expectancy tables could also result in under
compensation. Wide fluctuations in interest rates would necessarily
prevent uniform application of the Court's decision in Rodgers.
Though an argument can be made in favor of applying actuarial esti-
mates in the determination of the compensation due the non-delin-
quent spouse, the precedent for such application does not exist. In
Estate of Christ v. Commissioner,244 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit upheld the use of actuarial tables to compute the
value of a life estate in a dwelling house that had become a trust as-
set. 245 The argument against application of an actuarial estimate in a
242. Appraisers commonly think of value in three ways:
1. The current cost of reproducing a property less depreciation from all sources, that is,
deterioration and functional and economic obsolescence.
2. The value which the property's net earning power will support, based upon a capital-
ization of net income.
3. The value indicated by recent sales of comparable properties in the market.
The three approaches--cost, income and market data-are based on these three facets of
value. In the majority of. . . assignments, the appraiser utilizes all three approaches.
United States v. Eden Memorial Park Ass'n., 350 F.2d 933, 935 (9th Cir. 1965), quoting, THE
APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE, American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers (1964).
243. I.R.C. § 7403(c) provides that where the district court decrees a sale of the property that
the proceeds are distributed according to the findings of the court in respect of the interests of the
parties and the United States. If the sale occurs to satisfy a first lien held by the United States, the
United States may bid at such sale the sum "not exceeding the amount of such lien with the
expenses of sale." According to this provision, a minimum bid equal to the amount of the lien
may be bid by the United States.
244. 480 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1973).
245. Id. at 174.
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Rodgers situation is that unlike an annuity, the valuation of a home-
stead estate does not involve the determination of taxable income. In
Christ the court was concerned with the collection of taxes based on the
value of certain property, while in Rodgers the Court was concerned
with the collection of taxes by the sale of property. The application of
actuarial estimates in the latter situation does not follow prior
precedent.
The impact on state homestead rights would also be great.
Though the rights were created to protect the homestead from the reach
of creditors, applying the Court's holding that entitles the Internal Rev-
enue Service to seek a sale of the entire property removes the protec-
tions that originally existed at the state level. In Illinois, for example, a
homestead to the extent in value of $7,500 is "exempt from attachment,
judgment, levy or judgment sale for the payment" of debts or other
purposes.246 The exemption continues after the death of the home-
steader and accrues to the benefit of the surviving spouse. 247 Because
the provisions of I.R.C. Section 7403(b) provide that all persons with
liens upon or claiming any interest in the property involved be made
parties to the action, when the distribution of the proceeds is made ac-
cording to the findings of the court in respect of the interests, the pro-
tections afforded under state homestead law cease to exist. I.R.C.
Section 6323248 established the priority of liens that are paramount and
subordinate to the federal tax lien. It would follow that in the event of
a forced sale of homestead property, lienholders with priority and the
federal government would exercise their full rights to the proceeds,
even though the lienholders would virtually never be able to recover by
way of bringing a forced sale of the property themselves.
CONCLUSION
The decision in United States v. Rodgers will result in many far
reaching results that the Court failed to recognize when it allowed the
government to seek the sale of an entire property interest without re-
gard to the extent of ownership interest held by the delinquent tax-
payer. In addition to ignoring prior precedent and a role that was
traditionally reserved to the states, the Court failed to provide for ade-
quate compensation to those individuals whose property interests were
to be subjected to the forced sale. Furthermore, the Court provided the
246. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 12-901 (1983).
247. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 12-902 (1983).
248. I.R.C. § 6323 (1984). See supra notes 65-77 and accompanying text.
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federal government with greater power than was intended to exist
under the statute and the extension of this power came at the expense
of state created protections against the enforcement of judgments
against property that was protected from ordinary creditors at the state
level.

